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Abstract—Recently, the surge in popularity of Internet of
Things (IoT), mobile devices, social media, etc. has opened
up a large source for graph data. Graph embedding has
been proved extremely useful to learn low-dimensional fea-
ture representations from graph structured data. These feature
representations can be used for a variety of prediction tasks
from node classification to link prediction. However, existing
graph embedding methods do not consider users’ privacy to
prevent inference attacks. That is, adversaries can infer users’
sensitive information by analyzing node representations learned
from graph embedding algorithms. In this paper, we propose
Adversarial Privacy Graph Embedding (APGE), a graph adver-
sarial training framework that integrates the disentangling and
purging mechanisms to remove users’ private information from
learned node representations. The proposed method preserves
the structural information and utility attributes of a graph
while concealing users’ private attributes from inference attacks.
Extensive experiments on real-world graph datasets demonstrate
the superior performance of APGE compared to the state-of-
the-arts. Our source code can be found at https://github.com/
uJ62JHD/Privacy-Preserving-Social-Network-Embedding.
Index Terms—data privacy, graph embedding, inference at-
tack, adversarial learning
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, an unprecedented volume of data generated by
computer networks and services have a graph structure. For
example, from network structure to control flow graph, IoT
naturally generates a large amount of graph data continu-
ously. IoT expands human being’s abilities to understand
and control the physical world and grows increasingly in
popularity. By the end of 2018, there were an estimated 22
billion IoT connected devices in use around the world [1].
IoT applications and services span almost all the economic
and social sectors, including environment monitoring, smart
industry, public safety, smart medical systems, smart grid,
smart agriculture, smart transportation, behavioral patterns,
etc. [2]–[4]. Another major source for graph data is social
network, where people/mobile devices correspond to nodes
and links represent the relationships of nodes. People use
social networks to converse and connect with people sharing
similar interests in the real world [5]–[7]. Social media has
become a primary option for people to connect to new friends
and interact with their current friends. Currently, about 2.95
K. Li and G. Luo are with school of computer science and engneer-
ing, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu
600731,China (e-mail: kaiyang.li@outlook.com; gcluo@uestc.edu.cn).
Y. Ye, W. Li, S. Ji, Z. Cai are with the Department of Com-
puter Science, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30302 USA (e-mail:
yye10@student.gsu.edu; wli28@gsu.edu; sji@gsu.edu; zcai@gsu.edu).
billion people have social media accounts worldwide and this
number will increase to almost 3.43 billion in 2023 [8].
Graph embedding has made prominent progress in graph
analysis in the past few years [9] [10]. It’s a technique that
learns a low-dimensional representation for each node of a
graph based on network topology and nodes’ attributes. There
are several advantages of using graph embedding for graph
analysis: (1) Through this technique, the downstream appli-
cations such as node classification [11], clustering [12], link
prediction [13] and graph visualization [14] can be performed
on standard machine learning algorithms whose input must be
vectors. (2) Many graph mining algorithms contain iterative or
combinational computations, whose complexities are typically
NP-hard [15]. By graph embedding, the computation of these
tasks can be reduced dramatically. (3) It’s very challenging
to design parallel or distributed algorithms on graph data
directly [16]; more efficient parallel and distributed algorithms
can be developed readily on learned node representations.
However, the existing graph embedding algorithms do not
consider users’ privacy to prevent inference attacks. That is,
from the learned node representation, adversaries can infer
the sensitive information that users have no intent to disclose
originally [17].
On the one hand, graph data owners, such as IoT service
providers and social networks, collect a huge amount of graph
data and publish data to the third parties for research and
business purposes. The graph data can be exploited by third
party analysts to predict users’ purchase interest [18], discover
trending events [19] and so on. However, the third parties may
also use the sensitive information, such as sexual orientation
and political tendency, for malicious acts. Worse, even if these
sensitive attributes are deleted from graph, adversaries can
still mine the privacy information via inference attacks [20]
[21]. For examples, Social IoT topology and users’ behavior
data can be used to infer users’ geolocations [22], and users’
sexual orientation could be inferred based on their Facebook
data, such as users’ linkages, genders, and other attributes [23]
[24]. All of these demonstrate that our graph data is facing a
serious privacy issue. Since the vector representations of users
contain a lot of individual information, adversaries could also
launch an inference attack by mining the information from the
embeddings. E.g., a social network, like Facebook, publishes
the embeddings of users for academic research. An adversary
obtains the released embeddings and meanwhile collects part
of the users’ political tendency by trading [25] [26], crawling
the network [27], or utilizing other resources. If the adversary
trains a classifier on the embeddings and the collected political
tendency, the adversary could infer the other users’ political
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Fig. 1: A example of inference attack on Graph Embedding
tendency via the classifier, as shown in Fig. 1. Therefore,
before the data owners publish their graph embedding, they
must preprocess their data to prevent inference attacks.
On the other hand, existing privacy protection methods
typically prevent inference attacks by pruning the graph data
directly [22] [28] [29]. The subsequent graph embedding on
such preprocessed networks will induce suboptimal perfor-
mance for privacy protection and data utility reservation. This
is because: (1) Graph embedding and privacy protection are
decoupled in this process and limit the expressiveness of the
model. (2) Existing methods have limited options to preprocess
users’ attributes and links. For example, we can either swap
gender attribute of a user or delete it from the node completely
to conceal users’ private information. With graph embedding,
users’ gender information will be embedded in a continuous
space and therefore we can fine-tune the latent space through
gradient updates to protect users’ privacy precisely. (3) Tra-
ditional graph privacy-preserving methods only consider the
first-order friendship, while graph embedding concerns global
graph topology. Therefore, high-order friendship can also be
used to infer users’ sensitive information. For instance, two
users don’t have direct connections, but they may have shared
friends; if only the first-order friendship is utilized, these two
users might be considered irrelevant; but they are closely
related to each other due to the high-order friendship, which
means their private attributes might be similar with a high
probability.
What’s more, the only existing graph embedding privacy
preserving works [30] [31] try to achieve differential privacy
on link information. Let G1 and G2 be the neighbor graphs
differing by an edge. Z1 and Z2 are the embedding matrix
derived from G1 and G2, respectively. These works aim to
ensure the statistical difference on Z1 and Z2 is smaller than
a predefined bound. Since the purpose of the differentially
private mechanisms is not against inference attacks, these
mechanisms could not defend inference attacks on sensitive
attribute well.
Therefore, in this paper we propose a privacy-preserving
graph embedding framework, which integrates graph embed-
ding and privacy protection into an end-to-end pipeline against
inference attack. As we will demonstrate, our method enables
graph to release their privacy-preserved node embeddings to
the third parties with reduced risks of privacy concern. The
contributions of this paper are
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first graph
embedding algorithm against inference attack.
• To hide the sensitive information from graph embeddings,
we propose two mechanisms: Privacy-Disentangling and
Privacy-Purging from different perspectives.
• We propose Adversarial Privacy Graph Embedding
(APGE), an adversarial training based graph embed-
ding algorithm that integrates the mechanisms Privacy-
Disentangling and Privacy-Purging to preserve users’
privacy in an end-to-end graph convolution pipeline.
• Extensive experiments on graph datasets demonstrate
the superior performance of our method over previous
approaches in terms of private protection and users’ utility
reservation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the problem definition and preliminary knowledge.
Section 3 introduces our proposed methods. The experimental
evaluations and comparison results are reported in Section
4. Section 5 briefly summarizes the related works on graph
embedding and graph privacy preserving. Section 6 concludes
the paper.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND PRELIMINARY KNOWLEDGE
In this section, we will introduce the problem definitions
and preliminary knowledge of this work.
A. Problem Definition
A graph can be defined by G(V,E,X), where V denotes
the set of N nodes, E denotes the set of all edges, and X ∈
RN×P is the attribute matrix, each row of which representing
the feature vector of a node. Moreover, we introduce A ∈
RN×N as the adjacent matrix of G. In this paper, we use
capital variables (e.g., X) to denote matrices and lower-case
variables (e.g., x) to denote row vectors. Accordingly, we use
xi to denote the i-th row of the matrix X.
Attack model. We assume the adversary could obtain the
released graph embeddings Z, and the set of partial users’
private attribute labels Ypk . Specifically, Ypk could be captured
by trading [25], crawling [27], hacking [32], etc. The adversary
trains a classifier on Z and Ypk to predict the other users’
private attribute as follows:
yˆpi = arg max
ypi
PΛ(Y
p
i = y
p
i |Z,Ypk ), (1)
where Λ denotes the attacking classifier, Y pi is the random
variable of the i-th user’s sensitive attribute, ypi and yˆ
(p)
i
denote the possible value and the predicting result of the i-
th user’s sensitive attribute, respectively. For generality, we do
not constrain the types and parameters of the classifier Λ. Note
that the differential privacy is to protect the information that
if a record is in the dataset, therefore the differential privacy
could not defend the attack method we defined.
Privacy and Utility. In this work, we define the sensitive
attributes of users as privacy and the topology of the graph and
users’ non-sensitive attributes as utility. That means the learned
low dimensional node representations Z should satisfy two
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Fig. 2: Adversarial Autoencoder
properties: (1) the network structure and node utility attributes
are preserved; and (2) the sensitive information is concealed,
which means the privacy preserving graph embedding is robust
to all kinds of inference attacks regardless the attacking
classifier’s types and parameters. Therefore, if we use the
learned node representation matrix Z to analyze graph, the
accuracy of link prediction and utility attribute classification
should be preserved, while the inference accuracy of private
attribute should be reduced.
B. Graph Autoencoder
Graph autoencoder (GAE) [33] embeds a graph
G(V,E,X) to a low-dimensional space. The encoder
of GAE is a graph convolutional network (GCN) [34], which
updates hidden layer of a graph by
H(l+1) = σ(LH(l)W(l)), (2)
where L = D−
1
2 A˜D−
1
2 is the symmetrically normalized
graph Laplacian, H(l) is the output of l-th graph convolutional
layer, W(l) is the weight matrix of l-th layer that is to
be learned during training, and σ represents the activation
function, such as ReLU. Additionally, A˜ denotes the adjacency
matrix A with diagonal elements set to 1, i.e., every node
contains a self-loop, and Dii =
∑
j A˜ij denotes the degree of
node i. Usually, we stack two graph convolutional layers as the
encoder, with the propagation rule of the encoder expressed
as follows:
GCN(A,X) = Lσ(LXW(0))W(1). (3)
The purpose of GAE is to embed the structural information
of a graph to a low-dimensional space. Therefore, the decoder
of GAE reconstructs adjacency matrix via the inner product
of embedding matrix Z. The reconstructed adjacency matrix
Aˆ and the embedding matrix Z can be represented as follows:
Aˆ = σ(ZZT ), with Z = GCN(A,X). (4)
To preserve the structural information of a graph, GAE
optimizes the link prediction by minimizing the cross-entropy
loss:
Llink = − 1
N2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
Aij log(Aˆij), (5)
where Aij and Aˆij are the elements of A and Aˆ, respectively.
C. Adversarial Autoencoder
Adversarial Autoencoder (AAE) [35] is a probabilistic
autoencoder which uses the generative adversarial network
(GAN) to perform variational inference by enforcing the pos-
terior distribution of the hidden code to a specified prior distri-
bution. The classical AAE architecture is shown in Fig. 2(a).
The top row is an autoencoder which encodes the image u
to hidden representation z and decodes z to a reconstructed
image uˆ. The bottom row is a discriminator which classifies
the input is the code z or the noise sampled from the specified
prior distribution. As we train AAE, we update the encoder
and decoder to minimize the reconstruction error firstly. Then
we update the discriminator to distinguish if the input is from
true sample or the code generator, and we update the encoder
to fool the discriminator.
In [35], the above classical AAE has been further extended
to supervised AAE that augments the decoder with the one-
hot encoding of the label as shown in Fig. 2(b). As the label
and z are utilized jointly for reconstruction, z should contain
the label-invariant information of input u for reconstruction.
In other words, in supervised AAE the label information is
disentangled from the latent representation z. In this paper,
such the ability of disentangled of supervised AAE is exploited
for privacy protection.
III. PROPOSED MODEL
We first propose two privacy preserving embedding mod-
els corresponding to mechanisms Privacy-Disentangling and
Privacy-Pruning, respectively. Then we integrate the two mod-
els into one end-to-end pipeline to achieve the best perfor-
mance. In the sequel, we will introduce these models one by
one.
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A. Adversarial Privacy-Disentangled Graph Embedding
As discussed in section II-C, supervised AAE can be readily
adapted for privacy protection. The main issue is that the input
of supervised AAE is regular grid data, such as images, while
we are interested in graph structured data which are irregular.
We therefore extend GAE and supervised AAE and propose
Privacy-Disentangling mechanise for privacy preserving.
The architecture of original ”Adversarial Privacy-
Disentangled Graph Embedding” (APDGE) is shown in
Fig. 3(a), which is similar to supervised AAE and consists
of encoder, decoder and discriminator. To support graph
structured data, the encoder of AAE is replaced by GCN, that
is, latent code Z′ is extracted by a GCN: Z′ = GCN(A,X)
as shown in Eq. 3. Note that, the encoder is the stack of
two graph convolutional layers, so both first and second
order friendships are considered in this model. To disentangle
privacy from latent code Z′, we incorporate the privacy label
(e.g., gender) to the decoder. On the one hand, the distribution
of Z′ is regularized to the specified prior distribution. So the
information of Z′ is enforced to be as little as possible. On
the other hand, Z′ should contain the sufficient information
to reconstruct the topology and utility attributes of the graph.
In this way, the private information, which has been provided
in the privacy label, is removed from Z′. In other words,
the model learns a compressed Z′ that contains as little
information of the privacy label as possible, while being
sufficient for the decoder to reconstruct the utilities of graph.
Therefore, the learned graph embedding Z′ retains the utilities
of the graph while preserves the privacy information.
We hope the dimension of Z′ is low such that the privacy
could be extruded as much as possible. However, if we directly
concatenate Z′ and the one-hot privacy label encoding as the
input of decoder, the performance of decoder will be suffering
because the dimension of the concatenated vector is too low.
Besides, as the dimension of Z′ could be changed to trade
off the privacy and utility (which will be analyzed in section
IV-C), we hope the dimension of the embeddings does not
depend on the dimension of Z′. From extensive experiments,
we find a simple trick that successfully address these issues.
That is, before feeding the low dimensional representation Z′
to the decoder, we map it to a higher dimensional Z via a
expansion layer; then we concatenate privacy label with Z to
get Z+, which is fed to the decoder. Specifically, we use a fully
connected layer to implement the expansion layer. Therefore,
we modify the original APDGE to the final APDGE as shown
in Fig. 3(b).
Since the learned embedding Z′ should retain graph topol-
ogy and utility attributes information, we augment the decoder
to have multiple modules for adjacency matrix reconstruc-
tion and attribute classifiers. The adjacency reconstruction
module calculates the inner production of Z+ to reconstruct
adjacency matrix with the loss function for link prediction
as Eq.5. For utility attribute classification, we decode Z+
using the softmax function, followed by the cross-entropy loss.
Precisely, we predict the i-th user’s c-th utility attribute by
yˆ
(c)
i = softmaxc(z
+
i ), which is evaluated by the cross-entropy
loss as:
Lyc = −
1
|V(c)|
∑
i∈V(c)
Mc∑
j=1
y
(c)
ij log yˆ
(c)
ij , (6)
where V(c) is the set of users on which the c-th utility labels
are available for training, y(c)ij and yˆ
(c)
ij are the j-th dimension
value of the i-th user’s one-hot attribute label vectors y(c)i
and the predicting result yˆ(c)i respectively , and Mc is the
dimension of the c-th utility attribute. The total loss of APDGE
is the combination of the link prediction loss and utility
attribute classification loss:
Lrecon = Llink +
∑
c∈C
Lyc , (7)
where C is the set of utility attributes.
The discriminator D of this model is the same as the
discriminator of AAE. We use two fully connected layers
to classify the input to be real or fake depending on if the
input is a sample s from a unit Gaussian distribution or z′i
from the encoder of APDGE. We optimize the discriminator
to minimize the following loss:
Ldc = − log(D(s))− log(1−D(z′i)). (8)
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Overall, the training of APDGE contains three stages: (a)
Update the encoder and decoder to minimize the loss Eq. 7,
(b) Update the discriminator to distinguish the real samples
from the fake samples by minimizing the loss Eq. 8, and (c)
Update the encoder to fool the discriminator by maximizing
the loss Eq. 8. Upon finishing the training, we get the privacy-
preserved node representation (latent code) matrix Z.
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B. Adversarial Privacy-Purged Graph Embedding
The adversarial training mechanism discussed above disen-
tangles privacy latent factors from Z by disclosing the privacy
labels directly as input to the decoder. We can also achieve
a similar effect by disclosing the privacy labels as the output
of the decoder. We call the latter mechanism Privacy-Purging
and proposed ”Adversarial Privacy-Purged Graph Embedding”
(APPGE) as shown in Fig. 4. APPGE consists of two networks
(1) An Attacker whose purpose is to extract privacy informa-
tion from embedding matrix Z; and (2) An Obfuscator which
attempts to embed utility information and prevent the inference
attacks launched by the attacker.
Essentially, Attacker is a softmax classifier that aims to
predict privacy labels Y(p). We optimize the Attacker to
minimize the following loss:
Latt = − 1|V(p)|
∑
i∈V(p)
Mp∑
j=1
y
(p)
ij log yˆ
(p)
ij , (9)
where V(p) is the set of users on which the private attribute
labels are available for training, y(p)ij and yˆ
(p)
ij are the j-th
dimension value of i-th user’s privacy one-hot label y(p)i and
the predicting result of privacy yˆ(p)i respectively, and Mp is the
dimension of private attribute. The architecture of Obfuscator
is similar to GAE. The Obfuscator learns the latent code via
GCN and decodes latent code to reconstruct network structure
and utility attributes. In addition, it also tries to purge the
latent code such that the attacker can’t predict private attribute
accurately. Therefore, we optimize the Obfuscator to minimize
the reconstruction error and at the same time maximize the
prediction error of the attacker. So the loss of the Obfuscator
is as follows:
Lobf = Lrecon − λLatt, (10)
where λ is a hyperparameter that balances between utility and
privacy. When we train the model, we update the Attacker
and Obfuscator alternately until both modules’ loss functions
plateau.
C. Adversarial Privacy Graph Embedding
The Privacy-Disentangling and Privacy-Purging mecha-
nisms we discussed above preserve the privacy information at
the different stages of the training: the former is at the input of
the decoder, while the latter at the output of the decoder, and
they may work complementary to each other. Therefore, we
integrate both mechanisms into one framework ”Adversarial
Privacy Graph Embedding” (APGE) to jointly protect users’
privacy, with the model shown in Fig. 5. As we can see, the
architecture of APGE is very similar to APPGE that consists
of an Obfuscator and an Attacker, while we integrate APDGE
as the architecture of the Obfuscator. Note that the Attacker
launches an inference attack on the latent code matrix Z rather
than the latent code Z+, which is the concatenation of Z and
privacy label encoding.
Algorithm 1 Adversarial Privacy Graph Embedding
Input: G(V,E,X):A graph with links and features; T :
the number of iterations; Kdis: the number of steps for
iterating Discriminator; Katt: the number of steps for
iterating Attacker; d: the dimension of the latent variable.
Output: Z ∈ Rn×d;
1: for iteration = 1 to T do
2: for k1 = 1 to Katt do
3: Update the Attacker by minimizing the loss of Eq.9
4: end for
5: Update the Encoder and Decoder to minimize the loss
of Eq.10
6: for k2 = 1 to Kdis do
7: Sample from Gaussian distribution and Z′
8: Update the Discriminator to distinguish the real
samples from the fake samples by minimizing the loss of
Eq.8
9: end for
10: Update the Encoder to fool the discriminator by max-
imizing the loss Eq.8
11: end for
12: return Z
We present the training process of APGE in the Algorithm 1.
Given a garph G, the Attacker and Obfuscator of APGE can be
optimized by alternating gradient descent in two stages. Firstly,
for the Attacker, we minimize the prediction error of the
private attribute by Eq.9 as shown in Line 2-4. Secondly, for
the Obfuscator, whose training process is similar to ADPGE,
we update the model as shown in Line 5-10. After finishing
the training, we get the privacy-preserved graph embedding
matrix Z.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we empirically demonstrate the effectiveness
of our method,APGE, and compare it with the start-of-the-
art privacy preserving method. We also evaluate the model’s
robustness to different attack models and the impacts of the
hyperparameters and expansion layer in our method.
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TABLE I: Utility and Privacy Evaluation on Yale
Method link utility attributes(status) private attribute(class year)
ACC Macro F1 ACC Macro F1 MLP SVMACC Macro F1 ACC Macro F1
GAE 0.856 ± 0.003 0.856 ± 0.003 0.923 ± 0.002 0.927 ± 0.002 0.931± 0.002 0.930 ± 0.002 0.940 ± 0.001 0.941 ±0.001
GAE RM 0.854 ± 0.002 0.854 ± 0.002 0.933 ± 0.003 0.930± 0.003 0.907± 0.002 0.906± 0.002 0.918± 0.001 0.918 ± 0.001
CDSPIA 0.824 ± 0.002 0.824 ± 0.002 0.920 ± 0.001 0.916 ± 0.001 0.896± 0.003 0.896± 0.003 0.894± 0.001 0.893 ± 0.001
APDGE 0.840 ± 0.001 0.840 ± 0.001 0.884 ± 0.003 0.877± 0.003 0.824± 0.009 0.825± 0.009 0.798± 0.008 0.801 ± 0.007
APPGE 0.856 ± 0.002 0.856 ± 0.002 0.929 ± 0.005 0.923 ± 0.005 0.890± 0.011 0.890± 0.011 0.891± 0.009 0.890 ± 0.009
APGE 0.820 ± 0.002 0.820 ± 0.002 0.813 ± 0.010 0.780 ± 0.009 0.568 ± 0.014 0.579 ± 0.016 0.514 ± 0.013 0.518 ± 0.016
TABLE II: Utility and Privacy Evaluation on Rochester
Method link utility attributes(class year) private attribute(gender)
ACC Macro F1 ACC Macro F1 MLP SVMACC Macro F1 ACC Macro F1
GAE 0.862 ± 0.001 0.862 ± 0.001 0.953 ± 0.002 0.947 ± 0.002 0.781± 0.003 0.781 ± 0.003 0.769 ± 0.002 0.768 ± 0.002
GAE RM 0.857 ± 0.001 0.857 ± 0.002 0.948± 0.002 0.941± 0.002 0.732± 0.002 0.731± 0.002 0.724± 0.001 0.722 ± 0.001
CDSPIA 0.848 ± 0.002 0.848 ± 0.002 0.862 ± 0.002 0.851 ± 0.002 0.666± 0.002 0.666± 0.002 0.655± 0.001 0.654 ± 0.001
APDGE 0.849 ± 0.002 0.849 ± 0.002 0.924 ±0.003 0.915 ± 0.003 0.654± 0.003 0.651± 0.003 0.655± 0.004 0.652 ± 0.004
APPGE 0.857 ± 0.002 0.857 ± 0.002 0.895 ± 0.003 0.889 ± 0.003 0.717± 0.004 0.717± 0.004 0.717± 0.003 0.717 ± 0.003
APGE 0.848 ± 0.002 0.848 ± 0.002 0.923 ± 0.005 0.914 ± 0.005 0.636 ± 0.004 0.634 ± 0.004 0.649 ± 0.007 0.645 ± 0.007
A. Dataset and Baseline Methods
We conduct experiments on two real-world graph datasets:
Yale and Rochester 1 which collect all the facebook friend-
ships of Yale University and Rochester University in 2005 as
well as a number of user attributes including student/faculty
status (status for short), gender, major, second major, class
year, dorm/house, and high school. The two networks contain
8578 nodes, 405450 edges and 4563 nodes, 167653 edges,
respectively. For Yale, class year (6 categories) is set as the
sensitive attribute and status is set as the utility attribute; while
for Rochester, we regard gender (2 categories) as a sensitive
attribute and class year as the utility attribute. Indeed, if the
labels of sensitive attribute are provided, our methods can also
deal with the cases where the other attributes are private, e.g.,
sexual orientation and political opinion.
We evaluate the performance of proposed models against the
1https://escience.rpi.edu/data/DA/fb100/
following approaches: (1) GAE [33] learns network represen-
tation by autoencoder where encoder is graph convolutional
network and decoder consists of inner product to reconstruct
adjacency matrix and softmax function to predict utility at-
tributes. (2) GAE RM [33] is a framework similar to that
of GAE. But the sensitive attributes are removed from the
input attribute matrix X directly. (3) CDSPIA [28] is a state-
of-the-art approach to defending inference attacks on graph
by deleting or perturbing users’ attributes and linkages which
are closely related to privacy. We use CDSPIA to sanitize the
graph dataset and then embed the graph data processed via
GAE.
All the methods embed the graphs to a 64-dimensional
space. Particularly, in both APDGE and APGE, we first
compress each node’s information to a 16-dimensional vector
z′i for Yale and a 8-dimensional vector for Rochester. For
APPGE and APGE, the λ in Eq. 10 is set as 1 and 10 for
Yale and Rochester, respectively
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B. Utility and Privacy Evaluation
In this part of experiments, we verify the effectiveness
of the three models we proposed on utility reservation and
privacy protection and compare them with the baselines. We
qualify the utility in term of prediction accuracy of link and
utility attribute from the embeddings. For link prediction, we
compare models based on the classifier’s ability to correctly
classify edges and non-edges. Here the classifier is multi-
layer perceptron (MLP) [36] trained on embeddings. For utility
attribute prediction, an MLP is utilized to classify the utility
attributes based embeddings. Meanwhile, we qualify the pri-
vacy in term of prediction accuracy of sensitive attribute. Both
MLP and support vector machine (SVM) [37] are employed
as the adversaries to predict the sensitive attribute. For each
models, we repeat the experiment 10 times and report the
average results and standard deviation in Table I and Table
II.
Comparing the performance of GAE and GAE RM, we can
see that even if the private attribute is removed from the input
of embedding model, the attacker is still able to infer the user’s
privacy from embeddings by the inherent relation between the
private attribute and the input of embedding model. It can be
seen from Table I that APDGE obtains an average Macro-
F1 of 0.813 on private attribute, outperforming the previous
approach CDSPIA. Meanwhile, we observe that APDGE and
CDSPIA have similar performances on preserving utilities.
This indicates that the end to end training of graph embedding
and privacy protection provides a stronger system than the
decoupled method that processes the two steps separately for
preserving privacy in graph embedding.
From the results on both the Yale and Rochester datasets,
we find that APGE demonstrates the strongest capability of
protecting user’s privacy while retaining the utilities. On Yale,
APGE achieves an average Macro-F1 of 0.549 on private
attribute, outperforming APDGE by a significant margin of
30%. At the same time, the accuracies of link and utility
attribute are preserved largely. This demonstrates that the
integration of disentangling and purging mechanisms brings
an additional and significant gain in performance. We observe
that the preserving privacy performance of APGE is more
significant on Yale than on Rochester. We note that this is
because the privacy is more closely correlated with the utility
in the Yale dataset than Rochester. That is, user’s friendship
and status are strongly related to her class year. At the same
time, user’s linkage and class year are almost irrelevant to her
gender.
(a) Yale (b) Rochester
Fig. 6: Evaluation on the trade off between utility and privacy
Moreover, to illustrate the trade off between utility and
privacy, Fig. 6 reports the ratio of utility (that is the average
Macro-F1 of link and utility attributes) to privacy (i.e., the
Macro-F1 of private attribute). As we can see, APGE achieves
the best performance when both utility preservation and pri-
vacy protection are taken into account.
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Fig. 7: Impact of the hidden code’s dimension
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Fig. 8: Impact of the λ
C. Impact of hyperparameters
The dimension of hidden code z′i and the hyperparameter λ
have significant impacts to the performance of APGE. Fig. 7
shows the performance of APGE on privacy pretection and
utility preserving on Yale when the hidden code dimension
increases. Here, we define “1 - prediction accuracy of private
attribute” as the probability of successfully preventing infer-
ence attack. As we can see, when the dimension of hidden code
increases, link and utility attributes can be recovered more
accurately. On the other hand, the higher dimension of hidden
code is, the more private information is retained, leading to
a lower probability of preventing inference attack. Similarly,
Fig. 8 shows the performance of APGE on Yale when λ
increases from 0 to 100. As expected, when λ increases, we
observe a monotonic decrease of utility prediction accuracy
and a monotonic increase of the probability of resisting in-
ference attack. These results demonstrate that we could adjust
the dimension of z′i and λ to achieve a desired utility-privacy
tradeoff.
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Fig. 9: Inference attack on Yale with different attack models
D. Robustness against attack models
For generality, we assume the adversary could launch infer-
ence attack with any classifiers. As the precious works [22]
[28], we select different classifiers, including MLP, SVM,
k-nearest neighbors (KNN) [38], Random forest [39], Ad-
aboost [40], Gradient boost [40], as attack models to eval-
uate the robustness of our proposed methods. We train the
attack models using 10%-90% users’ embeddings and private
attribute labels to infer the other users’ sensitive attributes and
show the results in Fig. 9 and 10. As we can see, for all
the six attack models, APGE outperforms the other methods
significantly on reducing the Macro-F1 of sensitive attribute
prediction for both datasets. That’s because we attempt to
conceal the private information from embeddings with APGE,
if the information is removed from embeddings enough, any
classifier could not infer the sensitive attribute from the
embeddings.
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Fig. 10: Inference attack on Rochester with different attack models
There’s another observation, when we only remove the
sensitive attribute labels directly from the input attribute matrix
(i.e., GAE RM), the adversary could predict the other users’
privacy with the Macro F1 more than 0.8 on Yale dataset,
even if the adversary just obtain 10% users’ sensitive attribute,.
That means the users’ privacy faces serious threat, if the data
owner publishes graph embedding without considering privacy
preserving.
E. Effect of the Expansion Layer
As introduced in the section III-A, we expand Z′ to Z
via an expansion layer in APDGE to improve the embedding
performance. Since the structure of the Obfuscator of APGE
is the same as the ADPGE, the expansion layer is also used
in APGE as shown in Fig. 5. In this section, we remove the
expansion layer of APGE and directly input Z′ to Attacker
and Decoder to evaluate the impact of the expansion layer.
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Fig. 11: Impact of the Expansion layer
After finishing training the non-expansion layer model (non-
Ex model for short), we obtain the Z′ as the embeddings. We
qualify the utility and privacy of the embeddings learned by
APGE and non-Ex model on Rochester, and show the results
in Fig. 11. We can observe that the link prediction performance
of APGE is significantly larger than the non-Ex model. The
dimension of Z′ must be small enough to disentangle the
private information. Therefore, When we learn the embeddings
via the non-Ex model, the dimension of embeddings (i.e.,
the dimension of Z′) is too small to sufficiently contain the
utility information. On the other hand, as a lot of private
information is concealed in both APGE and the non-Ex model,
even if the embeddings’ dimension is small, the embeddings
could contain almost all the remaining private information.
Therefore, if we remove the expansion layer, the inference
accuracy of sensitive attributes does not reduce remarkably, as
shown in Fig. 11(b).
V. RELATED WORK
In this section, we briefly survey the existing graph em-
bedding methods and introduce the state-of-the-art privacy
preservation research on graph.
A. Graph Embedding Method
DeepWalk [41] is the early work to learn graph repre-
sentation by generating the node context via random walk
and mapping nodes to vectors based on skip-gram [42].
Node2vec [43] exploits a new method to generate node context
with considering both local and global structure information
and then embeds graph using DeepWalk. The above meth-
ods just utilize topology information, and some works have
been proposed to improve embedding performance taking
into account both the structure and attribute information.
TirDNR [44] combines DeepWalk and Doc2Vec [45] to
learn the inner-node relationship, node-word correspondence,
and word-label correlation. UPP-SNE [46] uses the attribute
matrix of social network as input and the node context as
label to supervised training model. Different from skip-gram
architecture, GAE [33] is a graph convolutional network via an
approximation of spectral graph convolutions for learning the
graph representation and outperforms skip-gram architecture.
Recently, ARGA [47] is proposed to add regularization to
GAE via an adversarial framework. Unfortunately, these above
graph embedding methods do not consider privacy preserva-
tion; that is, adversaries can infer the user’s sensitive attribute
from the embedding results.
B. Privacy Preservation on Graph
The only existing works to preserve privacy on graph em-
bedding is to achieve the link information differential privacy.
That is, even if we add or delete an edge from the original
graph, there is no significant statistic difference between the
embeddings of the original graph and the changed graph . Xu
et al. [30] adopts the objective perturbation mechanism [48]
on the loss function of the embedding model to achieve
differential privacy. Zhang and Ni [31] propose a Lipschitz
condition [49] on the objective function of the embedding
model and a gradient clipping strategy to ensure the differential
privacy on link information. However, both of the above
approaches do not consider to defend inference attack on
users’ sensitive attributes.
There has been a few attempts to prevent inference attack
with directly sanitizing graph data. Jia and Gong [50] build
a set of noise via adversarial machine learning and randomly
select the noise to mislead the inference attacker. However,
they only manipulate the users’ attributes and ignore the
linkages, and thus their method cannot resist the inference
attack utilizing topology information well. Cai et al. [28]
first propose an inference attack method with the mixture of
non-sensitive attribute and link relationship and then design a
privacy-preserving method by removing or perturbing users’
attributes and links that are closely related to private attribute.
He et al. [29] obtain the data-sanitization strategy by solving
an optimization problem, which can balance the trade off
between utility and privacy. However, these prior works do
not integrate the processes of privacy protection and graph
embedding, and thus is not suitable for privacy-preserving
embedding on graphs.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a novel graph embedding framework
that produces node representations with users’ privacy pre-
served. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first graph em-
bedding method that integrates privacy protection into GCN.
We introduce two different mechanisms for privacy protection
in graph embedding: latent factor disentangling and adversarial
training. The resulting algorithm APGE which integrates the
two mechanisms into one end-to-end pipeline demonstrates
superior performance as compared to the state-of-the-arts in
privacy protection while retaining similar accuracy in link
prediction and users’ utility classification.
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